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REBELS WITH A CAUSE: ARTISTS' STRUGGLES




Since its inception, the entertainment industry1 has utilized every legal
vehicle at its disposal to control all aspects of its copyrighted creations. In
the early days, the film industry operated under what is often referred to as
the "studio system,",2 while the recording industry simply signed
unsophisticated musicians to complicated contracts that vested all
copyright ownership in the record label. With television promising its
version of wealth and fame, unsuspecting performers of the 1960's and
1970's fell prey to the same contract manipulation, leaving them without
ownership of their creative contributions.
Today's artists have become more powerful, creating their own
production companies and record labels, thereby forcing the entertainment
industry to become even more creative in its efforts to maintain total
control of the final products and associated profits. To this end, the
entertainment industry recently attacked a target it has stalked for over
seventy years-the artist's right of publicity.
. J.D., Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis. Scott L. Whiteleather is Vice President
of CMG Worldwide, Inc., which represents 200 of the greatest legends from the worlds of sports
and entertainment. A published author, frequent speaker, and expert witness on the topic of
intellectual property rights, Mr. Whiteleather is the Managing Director of the Los Angeles office
of CMG Worldwide, Inc. Mr. Whiteleather would like to thank Daniel M. Siegel, without whose
help, this article would not have been possible.
1. This Article uses the term "entertainment industry" to refer to the combined businesses of
film, television and the recording industry. The following analysis primarily concentrates on the
motion picture and television industries.
2. During the early days of the film industry, actors were under contract to their studio.
During the term of the contract, artists were expected to make films as directed by the studio. In
addition, the artist could be "loaned out" to other studios without receiving additional
compensation or approving the project. In this manner, a studio controlled the actor much as one
might treat a piece of property. This practice is often referred to as the "studio system."
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This Article asserts that the entertainment industry has historically
possessed superior insight into developing technologies, and has used such
knowledge to carefully draft form contracts that manipulate artists. Part II
examines the contractual language binding such luminaries as Mickey
Rooney, Marilyn Monroe, Humphrey Bogart and Judy Garland, and the
resulting case law. This section explains how these artists, as well as many
others, signed contracts granting broad rights to the respective studios
involving technologies then unknown to the general public. Furthermore,
this section analyzes Warner Bros.' lawsuit against the James Dean
Foundation Trust.3 In that case, the studio was unsuccessful in usurping, in
perpetuity, the right of publicity of the late James Dean.4 The defeat
confirmed that broad, contractual language was no longer enough to
destroy a property interest in an individual's persona.
Part III provides a historic overview of copyright law, presents the
relevant sections of the Copyright Act of 1976 and introduces right of
publicity law. It then examines the industry's most recent attempt to
control artists' rights of publicity-copyright preemption. Part IV
discusses this approach as taken by Paramount Studios in its litigation with
George Wendt and John Ratzenburger of the television show Cheers.5 Part
V suggests the entertainment industry continues to attack performers'
struggle for legal control and profit by taking advantage of its superior
knowledge of developing technology when drafting standard form
contracts. Finally, this section contemplates potential strategies of the
entertainment industry, including legislation, which could forever change
the artist's role.
II. THE SCRIVENER OFTEN PREVAILS
For years performers have attempted to share in the vast profits
generated by their work only to discover that the standard contracts they
signed limited compensation to a weekly salary. Motion picture studios in
the 1940's and 1950's were able to take advantage of the industry's
superior knowledge of technology and the advancements in dissemination
that were to come. As such, many seemingly powerful celebrities entered
into agreements encompassing the future exhibition of their work in
television and videocassettes long before these technologies were fully
developed or known to the general public. Not surprisingly, disputes over
3. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Curtis Mgmt. Group, Inc., No. 91-4016, 1995 WL 420043 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 1993).
4. Id.
5. Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
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this contractual language have lead courts to interpret the possible
ambiguities related to these rights.
A. Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.
6
In 198 1, Mickey Rooney led a class action lawsuit against eight major
motion picture producers and distributors. Rooney claimed defendants,
while having secured the rights to exhibit his pre-1960 films, did not
possess the rights to exploit these films in alternative markets.
8
The complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to restrain trade
in violation of § I of the Sherman Antitrust Act.9 It further alleged
defendants "wrongfully have received and continue to receive all of the
profits from their commercial exploitation of the intangible property rights
owned by [Rooney] and the members of the class." 10 Additionally, the
complaint alleged defendants violated the Lanham Act" by falsely
representing that (a) "pre-1960 films made for exhibition in movie theatres
could be commercially exploited in the alternative markets by the
industry," and (b) Rooney and the members of the class "sponsored,
endorsed, or approved" use of pre-1960 films in the alternative markets.
12
Finally, the complaint alleged defendants engaged in unfair competition by
"misappropriat[ing] the names, likenesses, images, pictures, goodwill,
reputations and valuable property rights of [Rooney] and the members of
the purported class ....
In a pointed opinion, the court carefully reviewed the language in
several of Rooney's contracts.14 Rooney's unprecedented pre-1960 career
gave the court a unique opportunity to examine standard motion picture
6. 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y 1982).
7. The defendant motion picture studios included: Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.
("Columbia"); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. ("MGM"); Paramount Pictures Corp. ("Paramount");
RKO General, Inc. ("RKO"); Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp. ("Fox"); United Artists Corp.
("United Artists"); Universal City Studios, Inc. ("Universal"); and Warner Bros., Inc. ("Warner
Bros."). Id.
8. Id. at 213.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 213.
10. Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 213.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994); see also Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 213.
12. Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 213.
13. Id.
14. The court examined numerous contracts between Rooney and MGM, United Artists,
Columbia, Fox, Universal, Warner Bros., and Paramount. See id. Rooney actually made three
films for Fox prior to 1960. Id. at 217. The first two films he made while under contract with
MGM. Id. Rooney's services were acquired by Fox pursuant to a loan out agreement with MGM.
Id. Rooney's made his third film with Warner Bros. pursuant to a loan out agreement with
MGM. Id. at 219.
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agreements between 1933 and 1959. Based on the language in the
contracts, the court determined Rooney expressly granted all rights in and
to the alternative markets to the respective studios.' 5 The court explained:
It is difficult to conceive of contracts which more explicitly and
certainly provide the answer to the major issue before this Court
than the above-recounted contracts between Rooney and
defendants. These agreements make clear that the rights to
exhibit Rooney's pre-1960 films in the alternative markets are
held by defendants and not by Rooney.'
6
Considering the industry's historic control over performers like
Rooney and the profits realized from their films, a brief review of the
contractual language is instructive.
1. Television Rights in Standard Motion Picture Contracts
On August 29, 1933, at the age of thirteen, Rooney signed an
agreement with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer ("MGM") to act in the photoplay
Fire Chief for $300 per week.1 7 The contract provided in relevant part:
The term "photoplay" as used in this agreement shall be deemed
to include motion pictures produced and/or exhibited with sound
and voice recording, reproducing and/or transmitting devices,
radio devices, and all other improvements and devices which are
now or may hereafter be used in connection with the production
and/or exhibition and/or transmission of any present or future
kind of motion picture production.'
8
Arguably, a thirteen year-old budding actor would have little hope of
understanding the vast profits that would ultimately arise from the language
"all other improvements and devices which are now or may hereafter be
used" 19 to exploit the photoplay. z It is a fair assumption that even the best
lawyers and advisors of the time could not have foreseen the implications
15. Id. at 224.
16. Id. at 223.
17. Id.
18. Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 211.
19. Id.
20. As a frame of reference, sound-accompanied motion pictures ("talkies") debuted only
several years before 1933. See KENNETH M. CAMERON, AMERICA ON FILM: HOLLYWOOD AND
AMERICAN HISTORY 50 (1997). Television was still in its experimental form and would not
make its debut in the United States until almost the next decade. See De Forest's Training, Inc. v.
FTC, 134 F.2d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 1943). While this might explain Rooney's willingness to grant
such broad rights, no excuse is made for Rooney's lawyers and advisors.
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of such language and the resulting disadvantage to their client. Conversely,
it fair to assume that a motion picture studio had such visionary power.
Additional evidence of the entertainment industry's far reaching
vision appears as early as 1934. In that year, Rooney signed a second
contract with MGM binding the actor to "render his services as an actor in
television productions; and ... in connection with the broadcasting and/or
transmission of his likeness and/or voice by means of television .... ,,2
The appearance of this seemingly innocuous language is extraordinary
because at the time, television was only the subject of research and
experimentation.22 In fact, television was not introduced to the public until
five years later at the 1939 World's Fair in New York.23
As such, it is highly unlikely that performers of the period understood
the meaning of the terminology, much less the implications of the soon-to-
be ubiquitous medium. More importantly for the purposes of this Article, it
is essentially irrefutable that the motion picture industry inserted language
specifically addressing and garnering all rights to television broadcasts in
its standard contracts of this period even before the medium was available
on a limited basis.24  For example, an agreement between Humphrey
Bogart and Warner Bros. Inc., dated December 10, 1935, specifically
includes television under the definition of "Artists services."
25
By 1950, many performers were aware of the potential profit in
26television as a commercial medium. For example, early in that decade,
both Roy Rogers and Gene Autry sought to prevent the exhibition of their
respective work on television without additional compensation.27 In both
cases, the court determined Rogers' and Autry's pre-1950 contracts
expressly granted all such rights in perpetuity to the motion picture studio
with which they contracted.
28
21. Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 214.
22. De Forest's Training, 134 F.2d at 821.
23. Id.
24. The 1940 agreement between Loew's Inc. and Judy Garland provides, "The term
photoplays' as used in this agreement shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, motion
picture productions produced and/or exhibited and/or transmitted with sound and voice recording
reproducing and /or transmitting devices, television, radio devices and all other improvements
and devices which are now or hereafter may be used in connection with the production and/or
exhibition and/or transmission of any present or future kind of motion picture productions.
LOEW'S INC. AND JUDY GARLAND AGREEMENT para. 2 (Aug. 31, 1940) (on file with author).
25. HUMPHREY BOGART AND WARNER BROS., INC. AGREEMENT para. 5 (Dec. 10, 1935)
(on file with author) [hereinafter BOGART I AGREEMENT].
26. See Rogers v. Republic Pictures Corp., 213 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1954); Autry v. Republic
Prod. Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954).
27. See Rogers, 213 F.2d 662; Autry, 213 F.2d 667.
28. Autry, 213 F.2d at 668-69 (citing Rogers, 213 F.2d at 666).
2001)
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On March 7, 1960, the issue of television revenues led the Screen
Actors' Guild ("SAG"), to strike for the first time in its sixty-year history.29
Led by its president, Ronald Reagan, SAG ended the strike on April 18,
1960 and entered into a collective bargaining agreement with every major
studio except MCA and Universal. 30 As part of the agreement, the studios
consented to pay $2,625,000 to establish pension, health and welfare plans
for the performers. 3' They further agreed to contribute six percent of the
net television revenues of films made after February 1, 1960 to those
plans.32 In exchange, SAG agreed not to bring compensation claims for
films made prior to February 1, 1960 that were released to free television.
33
In Rooney, the Court paid special attention to this collective
bargaining agreement 34  noting that because he was a member of SAG
since 1937, Rooney was "bound by the provisions of all collective
bargaining contracts in effect between [SAG] and motion picture producers
.... , Therefore, Rooney was unable to assert any compensation claims.
In a final and harsh rebuke, the Court proclaimed, "Rooney's efforts
to avoid the clear meaning of these consequences are many and various,
sharing only the common characteristic of being unpersuasive. ''36  The
scrivener had won the war with respect to television.
2. Alternative Means
Rooney sought to limit the broad scope of the standard contract
language regarding exhibition via alternative means, such as
videocassettes.37 Rooney asserted "exhibition" should be interpreted as
exhibition to a mass audience and should not include individuals viewing
films on personal playback devices. 38 The court, however, determined this
argument "strains credulity to such an extent that merely to state the
arguments is to refute them.,
39
29. DENNIS McDOUGAL, THE LAST MoGUL 262 (1998). The actors objected to lack of
compensation for the television syndication of their old movies. Id.
30. Id. at 262, 264. Reagan "sold out" SAG to his agent and long-time friend and business
partner Lew Wasserman, founder of MCA and Universal. See generally MCDOUGAL, supra note
29, at 262-65 (commenting on the allegation that Reagan "sold out" SAG).





36. Id. at 226.
37. Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 227.
38. Id. at 227.
39. Id.
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There is little doubt "alternative means would include the exhibition
of films on video cassette, DVD, 40 DivX 4 I and all other viewing platforms.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that as early as 1944, the industry sought to
broaden the scope of "alternative means. ' '42 The employment agreement
between Ronald Reagan and Warner Bros. states:
It is further agreed that any motion picture in which Artist may
appear may be exhibited through or by any and all exhibiting,
reproducing and/or transmitting devices, including radio and
television and all other improvements and devices which are
now being used or may hereafter be used in connection with the
exhibition, reproduction and/or transmission of any present or
future kind of motion picture production.43
For years, similar language appeared in standard form contracts to
control future technological improvements." While each studio employed
slightly different terms, virtually every contract included broad language
regarding future developments.45
40. Digital versatile discs ("DVDs"), can store more than 4.7 Gigabytes of data. They are
used to hold full-length motion pictures in digital format. Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes Ill F. Supp. 2d 294, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
41. A DivX is a "compression program available for download over the Internet ... [that]
compresses video files in order to minimize required storage space, often to facilitate transfers
over the Internet or other networks." Universal City Studios, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 308. DivX is a
digital video format that enables quality, movie-length digital video and sound to fit on a 700
megabyte computer disc ("CD") as opposed to two gigabyte DVD. Lev Grossman, Next Up:
DVDs, TIME, July 31, 2000, at 35. The standard was developed by Microsoft but cracked by
French hackers, allowing easier trading and copying of digital video over the Internet. Id.
42. See WARNER BROS., INC. AND RONALD REAGAN AGREEMENT (Nov. 15, 1944) (on file
with author) [hereinafter REAGAN AGREEMENT].
43. Id. at 4, para. 6.
44. Virtually identical language appears in the 1946 employment agreement between
Humphrey Bogart and Warner Bros. See WARNER BROS. PICTURES, INC. AND HUMPHREY
BOGART AGREEMENT at 15 (Dec. 19, 1946) (on file with author) [hereinafter BOGART II
AGREEMENT]. Similar language is also found in the 1954 agreement between James Dean and
Warner Bros. See WARNER BROS. PICTURES, INC. AND JAMES DEAN AGREEMENT, at 6 para. 5
(Apr. 7, 1954) (on file with author) [hereinafter DEAN AGREEMENT].
45. The 1950 agreement between Marilyn Monroe and Twentieth Century language
included, "the present and future developments of the motion picture industry; including talking
motion pictures, movietone productions, television productions and all forms of motion pictures
and their accompanying devices..." TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX FILM CORP. AND MARILYN
MONROE AGREEMENT at 5 Seventh Covenant (May 2, 1950) (on file with author) [hereinafter
MONROE AGREEMENT].
20011
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B. "Or Otherwise": Broad Language in Employment Agreements is Not
Enough to Secure the Artist's Right to Publicity
In 1992, Warner Bros. sued The James Dean Foundation Trust
("Dean Trust") and its licensing agent, Curtis Management Group
("CMG"). 46 The suit alleged that pursuant to the actor's 1954 employment
contract, Warner Bros. acquired sole and exclusive ownership of Dean's
right of publicity.47 Warner Bros. also asserted the Dean Trust and CMG
violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"). 48 Finally, Warner Bros. sought a declaration that: 1) Dean's
right of publicity, as set forth in section 990,49 did not belong to the Dean
Trust, but to Warner Bros.; 2) the Dean Trust and CMG account for all
revenues received from the licensing of Dean's name, likeness and image
and 3) all revenues obtained by the Dean Trust and CMG should be
disgorged. 50 The Dean Trust and CMG contended the 1954 employment
agreement terminated upon Dean's death in 1955, and that his descendible
rights passed to his father, Dean's sole lineal heir.5'
52Warner Bros.' claim rested on the language of the agreement.
Specifically, Warner Bros. asserted that in paragraph 6(A), Dean granted
Warner Bros. the right to photograph his "acts, poses, plays and
appearances of any all kinds, and to produce and reproduce the same or any
part of them by photography, printing, and all other methods, and to
distribute and exploit the same in motion picture films, or otherwise ....
According to Warner Bros., the "or otherwise" language included Dean's
merchandising rights.5 4
In analyzing the contract language, the court disagreed with Warner
Bros., finding the agreement limited paragraph 6(A) to Warner Bros.' right
to exploit and advertise Dean's motion pictures.5 5 The court determined
that "or otherwise" appearing in paragraph 6(B) of the agreement limited
46. Warner Bros., Inc., v. Curtis Mgmt. Group, Inc., No. 91-4016, 1995 WL 420043 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 1993).
47. Id.
48. Warner Bros., 1995 WL 420043, at *1.
49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1982), amended by CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Supp.
2000).
50. Warner Bros., 1995 WL 420043, at *1.
51. Id.
52. Id. at *3.
53. Id. at *4 (emphasis added) (citing DEAN AGREEMENT, supra note 44, para. 6A).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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that paragraph to phonographic records. 6 Moreover, the court found
"nowhere in paragraph 6 (much less the entire 1954 Employment
Agreement) are merchandising rights discussed.,
57
The court contrasted paragraph 6(A) with paragraph 8, which
contemplated the use of Dean's name and likeness "other than in
connection with" motion pictures? 8 In paragraph 8, Dean granted to
Warner Bros., for the term of the contract, "the right 'to use or make use of
and control his name'; and 'to use and/or distribute his pictures,
photographs or other reproductions of his physical likeness for advertising,
commercial or publicity purposes . . . .59 Unlike the rights granted in
paragraph 6, Warner Bros. could exploit the rights conferred in paragraph 8
regardless of whether they were connected with the motion picture, its
advertisement, or its publicity. However, Warner Bros. owned the rights
for two years beyond the expiration of the agreement. 60 According to the
contract, "thereafter [Dean] shall be privileged to enter into such
agreements or transactions with reference to the use of his name and
likeness as he may deem proper.",
61
In support of its contention, Warner Bros. produced expert witnesses
to confirm the language "or otherwise" was the industry standard and was
generally understood to include the right of publicity.62 In response, the
Dean Trust and CMG produced their own experts to confirm the right of
publicity was not a subject of the contract. 63 In this instance, the court held
a studio could not expand the scope of a forty-five page standard motion
picture agreement to subsume the entire body of right of publicity law,
64
The justices recognized "or otherwise" did not on its face usurp the
publicity rights of James Dean.65
In reviewing this and other extrinsic evidence, the Dean Trust court
focused on three main facts.66 First, as early as 1937, Warner Bros. used
form contracts containing language similar to paragraphs 6 and 8 of the
56. Warner Bros., 1995 WL 420043, at *4.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing DEAN AGREEMENT, supra note 44, para. 8).
60. Id.
61. Warner Bros., 1995 WL 420043, at *4.
62. Id, This attempt completely failed. Id. at *6-7.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *7.
66. Id. at *6.
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agreement.67 However, Warner Bros. did not exploit actors' names and
likenesses apart from promotion of motion pictures until the 1950s.61
Additionally, Warner Bros. did not launch a merchandising department
until 1958.69
Second, Warner Bros. had form contracts from the same period
containing language identical, or nearly identical, to paragraphs 6 and 8 of
Dean's Employment agreement, which also restricted Warner Bros. from
using the artist for unrelated commercial purposes and merchandising.7°
Bogart's 1935 contract with Warner Bros., which included the "or
otherwise" language, 71 also specifically included a grant to the studio of the
sole and exclusive rights to make use of and control Bogarts' name and
likeness for advertising and commercial purposes whether or not connected
to the film. 72 This grant was limited to " a reasonable period, not exceeding
2 years after the termination" of the agreement.73
Finally, Warner Bros. used form contracts from the same period that
included specific merchandising provisions.74 For instance, in Ronald
Reagan's 1944 agreement with Warner Bros., Warner Bros. attached a
provision specifically withholding Reagan's right to make commercials and
to exploit his name and likeness. 75 This rider expressly limited the use of
Reagan's image to advertising and commercial tie-ups directly associated
with the motion picture.76
Based on such evidence, the court concluded Dean's 1954
employment agreement, read as a whole, did not grant the additional right
to exploit Dean's name and likeness,77 and that Warner Bros. failed to offer
78any probative or persuasive extrinsic evidence to prove otherwise. Had
the court determined differently, the effect would have been profound. The
interpretation proffered by Warner Bros., would mean all performers
67. Warner Bros., 1995 WL 420043, at *6. Bogart's 1946 contract with Warner Bros.,
included the "or otherwise" language, and granted the studio the sole and exclusive rights to make
use of and control Bogart's name and likeness for advertising and commercial purposes. BOGART
II AGREEMENT, supra note 44, at 11 para. 7. This type of grant was limited to "a reasonable
period, not to exceed two years after the termination" of the agreement. Id. at 10 para. 5.
68. Warner Bros., 1995 WL 420043, at *6.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. BOGART AGREEMENT, supra note 25, para. 10.
72. Id. at 7, para. 12.
73. Id. at 8, para. 12.
74. Warner Bros., 1995 WL 420043 at *6.
75. REAGAN AGREEMENT, supra note 42, at 7 para. 11.
76. Id.
77. Warner Bros., 1995 WL 420043, at *9.
78. Id. at *11.
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working under a standard form contract would relinquish their rights of
publicity in perpetuity with respect to the acts, poses, plays, and
appearances made while under contract.79 Moreover, the motion picture
industry would attain an unlimited ability to use performers, living and
deceased, in all forms of commercial and merchandising uses.
80
The resounding defeat in Dean Trust signaled an important transition
in the entertainment industry's strategy and its pursuit to control every
aspect of the performer and the related profits of the performer's work. 1
The industry could no longer rely upon the four corner approach of
interpreting an employment contract, its most sacred, battle-tested method
of appropriating artists' rights of publicity. Instead, the entertainment
industry turned to its next strategy: elimination of the right of publicity
altogether.
III. THE PREEMPTIVE STRIKE
As a composer painstakingly places the final note on a page, as a
painter, with delicate precision, applies a final brush stroke, as an author
types the words "The End," something almost indefinable has taken place.
Amid the clanging and chatter of our lives, the composer has heard a
whisper of melody. The painter has allowed us a momentary glimpse of
the world seen through the eyes of another. By positioning a mirror before
our lives, the author has asked us to examine, explore, and sometimes even
challenge who we are. Each has been inspired to bring to life an original
expression.
79. The court's decision is also supported by the course of dealing between actors and other
studios. For example, in a one paragraph letter agreement dated June 12, 1939, Judy Garland's
1935 contract with MGM was forever amended. Letter from Judy Garland and Ethel Gilmore to
Loew's Inc. (June 12, 1939) (on file with author). The letter, signed by Ms. Ethel Gilmore and her
daughter, assigned, "perpetually, without limit as to time... to use my name, photograph,
likeness and/or the reproduction of my voice and sound effects in connection with any advertising
and/or commercial tie-ups or for any other commercial purposes provided that such tie-ups or
other commercial uses refer to said photoplay now entitled the "WIZARD OF OZ ... " Id. MGM
may not have imagined the lasting impact of the Wizard of Oz, but they clearly realized that the
rights associated with Judy Garland's persona were not fully acquired in her contract, and hence
the letter agreement. Id.
80. Performers and their heirs often have strong feelings as to what products make
appropriate endorsements. See generally, Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391,
1400 (9th Cir. 1996). Abdul-Jabbar objected to the use of his former name, Lew Alcindor, in a
GMC commercial. Id. at 1393-94. Tobacco and alcohol products are frequently considered
unsavory associations based upon personal choices or the public personality of the performer.
See infra Part III.B. In the case of certain products or services, no amount of money will entice
the performers or their heirs. See infra Part III.B. Arguably, the executives of a motion picture
studio often have interests in direct conflict with the interests of such heirs. See infra Part III.B.
81. See infra Part III.B.
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Inspiration has been defined as, "The creative impulse of an artist,
often seen as a supernatural prompting. ' 82 Yet as we clumsily attempt to
understand the source of creativity, there is no mistaking the value that
society has placed upon the tangible expression of this intangible process.
A. Copyright Law
1. Historical Overview
For nearly five hundred years, laws have protected and encouraged
the creative spirit. One of the earliest statutes to protect authors states,
"[i]t is decreed that henceforth no printer in this city shall dare to print...
any words.., unless ... the author or his heirs ... have declared their
consent and requested the printing." 84 In Great Britain, the 1710 Statute of
Anne provided protection for authors and booksellers by granting "the sole
right and liberty of printing such books for the term of one and twenty
years. 85
As early as 1672, the Massachusetts Bay Colony statutorily
recognized the need to protect authors' rights to their original works.86 The
statute provided no printer could reproduce copies "except as agreed upon
by the owner or with his consent." 87 By 1786, a Continental Congress
resolution prompted twelve of the original states to adopt statutes
protecting the writings of authors for a limited period of time.88 At the
Constitutional Convention in 1787, James Madison stated a "Copyright
Clause" granting "national" rights89 would serve three purposes. First,
federally copyrighted material would increase the author's economic
benefit from the copyrighted material. 90  If only some statutes
acknowledged copyright protection, the economic value of an author's
work would be diminished. 91 Second, federal copyright protection would
promote uniformity and avoid the practical difficulties of enforcing the
82. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY page 501 (1988).
83. WILLIAM H. FRANCIS & ROBERT C. COLLINS, PATENT LAW 837 (1995).
84. Frank D. Prager, History of Intellectual Property from 1545-1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 711, 750 (1944) (citing Sixteenth Century records from Venice).




89. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556 (1973).
90. Id. at 558.
91. Id.
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divergent laws of each state. 92  Finally, Madison posited that federal
copyright would protect the public welfare by encouraging progress in
artists' talents, scientists' inventions and other useful arts.
93
Article I, section 8, paragraph 8, of the United States Constitution
embodies Madison's reasoning. 94 The text provides that Congress shall
have the power "to promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." 95 Congress utilized this power
to enact the 1909 Copyright Act.
96
Congress has amended the Copyright Act many times in an effort to
address an ever-changing society. 97 In 1976, Congress enacted the most
recent, complete revision, which acknowledged that authors continue to
find new methods of expression." New technology, such as
phonorecording, rendered the 1909 Act inadequate. 99 The 1976 revisions
were an attempt to resolve such problems. °00 While a complete analysis of
Title 17 is beyond the scope of this Article, §§ 102, 106 and 301 demand
specific attention.
Section 102 of the Copyright Act discusses the subject matter of
copyright protection:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying works;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
92. Id. at 556 n.12.
93. Id.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
95. Id.
96. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 563-65.
97. Id. at 562.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (recognizing "any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed").
99. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 562-65.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476).
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(7) sound recordings
(8) architectural works
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.' 0'
The House Report accompanying the Copyright Act expressly states
that the enumerated categories are merely illustrative, and do not exhaust
the scope of original works of authorship the bill is intended to protect.
102
Section 106 enumerates those rights that are the exclusive province of
the copyright holder:
Subject to Sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.1
0 3
In addition to addressing advances in technology in the 1976 revision,
Congress also sought to harmonize United States copyright law with
copyright laws throughout the world.' °4 This task, however, required
101. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
102. See supra note 100.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
104. See supra note 100.
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addressing a doctrine unique to the United States copyright system, the
"common law" copyright.
2. Common Law Copyright
For years, the federal government and sovereign states held
concurrent power to enact copyright law.'0 5 The United States Supreme
Court recognized such common law copyrights in Wheaton v. Peters.10 6 In
1973, the Court held in Goldstein v. California10 7 that individual states
retain the power to grant copyright protection to the works of authors, as
long as state protection does not conflict with federal law. 10 8 For years, the
courts construed this concurrent power to mean that federal copyright law
protected published works, while unpublished material fell under state
common law.'0 9 As a result, because not all states recognized common law
copyright, protection remained inconsistent throughout the country." 0
Inconsistencies within the dual system posed various problems.
Unpublished works, protected by common law copyright, theoretically
maintained protection for eternity if the state's common law permitted."'
The inconsistencies also generated uncertainty, particularly when
attempting to determine the scope of protection of any unpublished work.12
Moreover, because the United States was the only country burdened with
this dual system, "[i]n an era when copyrighted works can be disseminated
instantaneously to every country on the globe," the United States needed
uniform national copyright protection more than ever.l13
3. Section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act
Exercising power established by the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, 14 Congress enacted § 301 of the Copyright Act."
1 5
105. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 553.
106. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
107. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
108. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 571.
109. 1 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[A] (2000)




113. See supra note 109.
114. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 providing:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
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Subsection (a) provides. that beginning January 1, 1978, those works of
authorship within the broader scope of § 106 and specified in §§ 102 and
103 are henceforth covered by § 301; those rights falling within this
purview are no longer entitled to state common law copyright protection.'
6
Subsection (b) provides those rights not falling within the controlling or
superceding power of § 301 as enunciated in subsection (a), remain rights
and remedies protected under state common law and state statutes. 11
7
It is evident the legislators of the 1976 Act believed § 301 would
require minimal interpretation:
The declaration of this principle in § 301 is intended to be stated
in the clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to
foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its unqualified
intention that Congress shall act preemptively, and to avoid the
development of any vague borderline areas between state and
Federal protection.18
Section 301 was enacted for the principal purpose of eliminating such
dichotomies between state common law protection of unpublished works
and federal protection of published works, by establishing clear guidelines
regarding when Congress intended federal law to preempt its state law
counterparts. 19 Under § 301, a work obtains statutory protection upon
creation or, as defined in § 101, when it is "fixed in a copy or phonorecord
for the first time." 120 Thus, with § 301, Congress attempted to abrogate
common law copyright and eliminate the concept of publication as the
dividing line between common law and statutory protection1
4. Application of § 301
Preemption under § 301 requires a showing of two elements. 122 First,
the work must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression and fall within
the subject matter of copyright as specified by §§ 102 and 103.123 This rule
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. Id.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
116. Id. § 301(a).
117. Id. § 301(b).
118. Id. § 301 (citing H.R. REP No. 94-1476).
119. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983).
120. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 301(a).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (citing H.R. REPNO. 94-1476).
122. Id.
123. See Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc. 820 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1987);
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 871 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Fleet v. CBS,
Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 650-51 (Ct. App. 1996).
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applies whether the work is published or unpublished. 24 Second, the law
must create legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright, as specified by §
106. 125
To demonstrate, a work not "fixed in a tangible medium of
expression" as required by § 102, such as a speech or live performance not
transcribed or captured on videocassette, fails to satisfy the first element.
26
As the work would not be preempted under § 301 because it is not fixed,
common law and state statutes could conceivably protect such works.
Similarly, where a state law affords rights affecting the use of a work
falling within the scope of § 102, such rights must be "equivalent" to the
federal statute if they are to be preempted. 127 The state protected right must
require proscription of the unauthorized reproduction, performance,
distribution or display of the work. 1
28
The Supreme Court has held that for a common law right to be
equivalent to federal protection, infringement must occur by the mere
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of the protected work. 1
29
Where a state law affords rights containing "extra elements" beyond those
enumerated in the federal statute, such law will likely escape § 301
preemption. 130
The 1976 Copyright Act is hardly free from any conceivable
misinterpretation. While this most recent revision addressed the question
of preemption with respect to state common law copyright protection, the
question remains, does § 301 preempt more than common law copyright?
The definition of "equivalent rights" remains a topic of heated
debate.i 31 Some argue that where competing rights of any kind exist in the
same piece of property, preemption is required. 132 Others contend it is the
124. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
125. Id.; see also Del Madera, 820 F.2d at 976.
126. See, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding Dr. King's speech during The March on Washington was so widely
reproduced and disseminated that it constituted a general publication, and thus was in the public
domain).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a), (b).
128. Id.
129. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
130. Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 871.
131. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1518.
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nature of the rights in that property that must be equivalent for preemption
to occur.'
33
Those who argue that copyright should preempt the right of publicity
often place these two legal theories on a mythical collision course. In order
to fully understand the conflict, however, one must explore the history of
the right of publicity.
B. The Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is the right of every person to "control the
commercial use of his or her identity."' 34  Right of publicity statutes
typically prohibit an individual from using another's name, voice,
signature, photograph or likeness in products or advertisements without
that person's permission.1
35
For all of the confusion surrounding this area of law, the right of
publicity can be stated as nothing more than the right of every person to
control the commercial use of his or her identity. 136 While this burgeoning
legal theory applies to the entire population, there is little wonder why
litigation of this type usually involves those in the entertainment industry.
An individual whose livelihood depends upon the calculated exploitation of
his or her name, image, and likeness will inherently suffer the greater loss
by the unauthorized use. Perhaps the greatest asset a celebrity has to sell is
his or her "persona." To fully understand this area of law and the direction
in which it is headed, it is critical to examine its history.
1. Transition from the Right to Privacy to the Right of Publicity
The "right of privacy" is not explicit in the United States
Constitution. 37  However, Justice Brandeis acknowledged this right in
133. Id.
134. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § I.I[A][1]
(1999) [ hereinafter 1 MCCARTHY].
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997). An individual whose livelihood depends upon
the calculated exploitation of his or her name, image, and likeness will inherently suffer the
greater loss by author's unauthorized use of his or her likeness. See Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983); see also David E. Shipley, THREE
STRIKES AND THEY'RE OUT AT THE OLD BALL GAME: PREEMPTION OF PERFORMERS' RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369 (1988). The court
suggests that a celebrity "persona" is a valuable asset. Carson, 698 F.2d at 837.
136. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 134, § 1.1[A] [1].
137. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Olmstead v. United States.'38  Brandeis argued that despite the lack of
specific language in the Constitution, the framers conferred the right to be
left alone as the "most comprehensive of rights" and the "right most valued
by civilized men.
'139
In addition to Justice Brandeis' service on the Court, he also gained
notoriety for an 1890 law review article written with his then law partner,
Samuel D. Warren. 14  In their article, Brandeis and Warren assert an
individual has a common law right to determine "to what extent his
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.''
Initially, the New York courts accepted this new legal theory of a
right to privacy. 142 However, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,
143
the court rejected the doctrine. 144 The defendant in Roberson used the
photograph of an attractive young lady to advertise its product without
authorization. 145 In holding no right of privacy existed, the court expressed
a fear of the "vast amount of litigation involving not only pictures," but
even "a comment on one's looks, conduct, domestic relations or habits.' 46
In response to this ruling, the 1909 New York Legislature enacted a
statute now known as the New York Civil Rights Law ("Civil Rights
Law"). 147 The statute prohibits the use of the name, portrait, or picture of
any living person without prior consent for "advertising purposes" or "for
the purposes of trade."'
148
138. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating
wiretapping did not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
139. Id. at 478.
140. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890).
141. Id. at 198. Warren had married Miss Maybel Bayard, daughter of Senator Thomas
Francis Bayard, Sr. They set up housekeeping in Boston's exclusive Back Bay Section and began
to entertain elaborately. The Saturday Evening Gazette, which specialized in the 'blue blood
items,' naturally reported their activities in lurid detail. This annoyed Warren, who took up the
mater with Brandeis. The article was the result. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 966 (1964) (quoting
ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1960)); see also Oliver R.
Goodenough, Go Fish: Evaluating the Restatement's Formulation of the Law of Publicity, 47 S.C.
L. REV. 709, 721 (1996) (claiming the myth surrounding the article has been dispelled); William
L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
142. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
143. 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
144. Id. at 443.
145. Id. at 442.
146. Id. at 443.
147. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992).
148. Id.
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However, it would be another fifty years until Justice Jerome Frank
formulated the moniker "right of publicity" in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 14 9 In that opinion, Justice Frank stated New
York law contained a right of publicity distinct from the right of privacy.150
The right of publicity enabled individuals to protect themselves from
unauthorized commercial appropriations of their personas.' 51 Thus, Justice
Frank recognized an independent, common law right protecting economic
interests rather than the personal, emotional interests associated with the
right of privacy.'
152
The court's rationale for recognizing the right of publicity reflected
concern that prominent persons would no longer receive money for the use
of their likenesses in newspapers, magazines, and advertisements. 53 Such
use would only yield money if it resulted in an exclusive grant to the
particular advertiser. 154 As such, the right of publicity was necessary to
ensure exclusivity.155
2. From Privacy to Publicity
Since these early decisions, courts and legal scholars have struggled
with this "haystack in a hurricane" area of law. 156 In 1960, William L.
Prosser identified four torts that fell within the doctrine of the right of
privacy: (a) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs; (b) publication which places the plaintiff in false light in the
public eye; (c) public disclosure of true, embarrassing private facts about
the plaintiff and (d) appropriation of the plaintiffs name or likeness for
commercial purposes. 1'5 7 Prosser's attempt to link the right of publicity to a
right of privacy, however, may have confused the debate. 58  For this
reason, opponents to a decedent's right of publicity continue to point to the
limitations of the right of privacy.' 59 The two rights are, however, separate
and distinct.
60
149. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).





155. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
156. Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956).
157. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 142, § 117; see also Prosser, supra note 141, at 389.
158. Prosser, supra note 141, at 389.
159. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 327-28 (Ct. App. 1979).
160. KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 715 (Ct. App. 2000).
REBELS WITH A CAUSE
The right of privacy is a personal right. 161  As such, actionable
damages for an invasion of this right are measured by mental distress.
62
Thus, the injury dies with the plaintiff. 63 The right of publicity however, is
a property right. 164 A violation of this right results in a commercial injury
to the business value of one's personal identity.' 65  For this reason,
damages for infringement are calculated according to the fair market value
of the plaintiffs identity, unjust enrichment, the infringer's profits and
damage to the business of licensing the plaintiff s identity.'
66
The commercial use of an individual's persona is a business. 67 The
control of this business is the basis by which famous persons generate
income.1 68  The Prosser definition of appropriation ignores this
distinction. 1
69
Recognizing the right of publicity as a property right makes this
valuable asset descendible and transferable. 170 In this manner, a celebrity's
heir may continue to reap the pecuniary benefit of the life-long efforts of
their loved one. 17 1 Otherwise, commercial entities could profit from the use
of a celebrity's persona instead of the celebrity's heirs. 172 Even worse, a
deceased performer's likeness could be used to endorse products that the
performer would consider reprehensible.
173
Copyright law offers no protection against the unauthorized use of an
individual's likeness. 74 As such, some scholars insist the right of publicity
must be viewed as a separate and distinct area of law. Most notably,
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy claims the right to publicity is neither a
161. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture - The Human
Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM. VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 134
(1995).
162. Id.
163. See Lugosi, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
164. McCarthy, supra note 161, at 134.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Sheldon N. Halpem, Essay, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent
Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 856-57 (1995).
168. See id.
169. Prosser, supra note 141, at 401-06.
170. Addison E. Dewey, The Evolving Doctrine of Right of Publicity: Judicial Protection of
Celebrity's Pecuniary Interest from Commercial Exploitation of His or Her Identity and
Theatrical Style, 22 CREIGHTON L. REv. 39, 59 (1988).
171. Id. at 54, 61.
172. See id. at 54.
173. See id. at 42-43.
174. KNB Enters., 92 Cal. Rptr 2d at 715.
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trademark nor a type of privacy right, but rather an entirely different legal
right, despite the similarities. 
175
Arguably, the Supreme Court agrees with McCarthy's
characterization. In the high court's only foray into this doctrinal jungle,
the Court noted:
[p]etitioner's right of publicity here rests on more than a desire
to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in
the act; the protection provided an economic incentive for him to
make the investment required to produce a performance of
interest to the public. This same consideration underlies the
patent and copyright law long enforced by this court.
17 6
Justice White's view remains the backbone of the right of publicity.
177
3. The Current State of the Right of Publicity
Currently, twenty-five states recognize a common law right of
publicity for living persons. 178  In addition, fifteen states have enacted a
statutory right of publicity.179 Fourteen states also recognize a postmortem
right of publicity.18 0 However, New York continues to recognize a version
of the right of publicity for living individuals under a theory of right of
privacy. 18 Despite the piecemeal development and evolution of the right
of publicity, a patchwork of reasonably consistent precedent has emerged.
175. McCarthy, supra note 161, at 131.
176. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
177. See, e.g., id. Most recently, American Law Institute's Restatement of Unfair
Competition includes unfair competition as a separate legal theory. Goodenough, supra note 141,
at 714. It is interesting to note, however, that the drafters of the Restatement adopted Prosser's
concept of "appropriation." Id. at 715. By employing Prosser's terminology, the Restatement
may have the unfortunate effect of perpetuating the "personal right" versus the "property right"
confusion.
178. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 52 (1994).
179. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1997); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 32-13-1-1 to -20 (Michie 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie 1999);
MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-202 (Michie
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 597.790-.810 (Michie 1999); OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§
839.1-.2 (West 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1448-1449 (West 1993) R.I. GEN. LAWS §
9-1-28.1 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108 (Michie 1995); TEX. P.
-CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-015 (West 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -6 (Lexis 1998); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1997).
180. Prosser, supra note 141, at 386-89.
181. Id. at 385.
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a) The Use of a Name and Image
In 1909, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the use of a person's
name and picture in an advertisement without consent violated the right of
privacy. 182 Similarly, in 1918, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
unauthorized use of a person's photograph in a moving picture theatre for
business purposes violated the right of privacy.183  In 1938, the North
Carolina Supreme Court determined that the unauthorized use of a radio
entertainer's photograph in a bread commercial and a commercial for a
stage show violated the entertainer's rights of privacy. 184 In each of these
decisions, the courts recognized the value inherent in the commercial use of
an individual's image.' 85  Today, the unauthorized use of a living
individual's name or image is generally recognized as an infringement of
that individual's rights.
186
b) The Use of a Persona
A persona can be described as attributes that are so inextricably
entwined with an individual that the mere presentation of these attributes
calls to mind one particular individual.187  In 1974, a federal court in
California determined that a televised cigarette commercial featuring the
race car of a famous driver without his permission violated his right of
publicity. 8  Although the driver of the car was unrecognizable, the court
found the familiar markings of the car would lead people to infer that the
plaintiff endorsed the product.'8 9 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that the
use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" to advertise a portable toilet, was
actionable because the famous introduction was so closely associated with
Johnny Carson that its unauthorized use infringed upon Carson's right of
publicity. 190 Comparably, the use of a robot dressed and designed to mimic
Vanna White to advertise merchandise was actionable in California in
182. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Ky. 1909).
183. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 533 (Kan. 1918).
184. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 64 (N.C. 1938).
185. See Kunz, 172 P.2d 532; see also Flake, 195 S.E. 55.
186. Sudakshina Sen, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59
ALB. L. REv. 739, 742 (1995).
187. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). Here,
even though a robot looked nothing like the celebrity, there was no mistaking the identity of
Vanna White in the advertisement. Id.
188. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974).
189. Id.
190. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
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1993.' 9' Analogously, in 1996, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of the
birth name of a sports figure to advertise automobiles infringed his right of
publicity, even though the sports figure had legally changed his name. 192
In each of the above cases, the defendants usurped the celebrity's
persona for commercial gain.' 93  Essentially, the courts found certain
objects, phrases, or characteristics were so closely associated with the
particular celebrity as to infringe upon a right of publicity. 9 4
c) Impersonators
Look-alike performers can also potentially infringe upon entertainers'
rights of publicity. 195  The most famous of the impersonator cases
concerned singers Bette Midler 96 and Tom Waits. 197  In each, an
impersonator mimicked the star's voice for a television commercial. 98 In
Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,199 an impersonator was sued after Ms. Midler
declined an offer to record the commercial.2 °0  Young & Rubicam, an
advertising agency, hired a vocalist who previously worked as a backup
singer for Ms. Midler and requested she "sound as much as possible like
the Midler record.",
20 1
In Waits v. Frito Lay, Inc.,20 2 the court recognized Mr. Waits'
personal policy that "musical artists should not do commercials because it
detracts from their artistic integrity., 20 3  In addition, the court found
defendants produced a second version of the commercial due to concerns
that legal action might result because the impersonator sounded too similar
to Waits.2 °4
191. White, 971 F.2d 1395.
192. Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1400 (9th Cir. 1996).
193. Carson, 698 F.2d at 837; White, 971 F.2d at 1399; Abdul-Jabbar, 75 F.3d at 1400;
Mostchenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827.
194. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 837; White, 971 F.2d at 1399; Abdul-Jabbar, 75 F.3d at 1400;
Mostchenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827.
195. See, e.g., Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); see also
Apple Corps Ltd. v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342, 349 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). Not surprisingly,
however, the Nevada right of publicity statute specifically exempts impersonators from right of
publicity claims by their subjects. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.790 (Michie 1999).
196. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
197. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
198. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461; Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
199. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Waits, 978 F.2d 1093.
203. Id. at 1097.
204. Id. at 1098.
REBELS WITH A CAUSE
These cases recognize that celebrity rights of publicity reside in the
associative value of their names, likenesses, voices, and images.20 5 It is the
persona of a celebrity that attracts public attention to the advertisement.2 °6
The purpose of a celebrity in an advertisement is to "increase the value or
sales of the product., 207 This is accomplished by identifying the celebrity
with the product and thereby "siphoning some of the publicity value or
good will in the celebrity's persona into the product., 20 8 This goodwill or
publicity value is a marketable product belonging to the individual.20 9
With respect to a decedent's right of publicity, one must reexamine
the "personal right" verses "property right" controversy. 21  States
following the Prosser model consider the right of publicity a personal right,
and therefore, any claim for such an invasion is said to die with the
plaintiff.21 For example, under the 1903 New York statute, the right to
contest the use of an individual's identity in advertising ends at death.212
4. California Civil Code Section 3344
Enacted in 1982, California Civil Code section 3344 provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising
or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise,
goods or services, without prior consent. . ., shall be liable.
213
Section 3344 specifically exempts the use of a name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness in connection with news, public affairs, sports
broadcast or account, or any political campaign. 214 Moreover, section 3344
instructs that the issue as to whether a use should be construed as so
directly connected with commercial sponsorship that it should be
considered within the scope of subsection (a), is a question of fact.21 5
205. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64; Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104; see also Halpern, supra note
167, at 857.
206. Halpern, supra note 167, at 857.
207. Id. at 856.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 857.
210. Id. at 858-59.
211. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992).
212. Id.
213. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997).
214. Id. at § 3344(d).
215. Id. at § 3344(e).
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In short, the right of publicity does not prevent the use of a
216personality's name in news reporting, and does not preclude the use of
identity in an unauthorized biography. 1 7 Similarly, it cannot be used to
prevent satire or parody, which includes the use of an individual's
identity.218 Accordingly, the right of publicity applies only to advertising
and similar commercial uses.219
IV. WHERE COPYRIGHT AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY THEORETICALLY
COLLIDE
The right of publicity guards against the unauthorized use of a
person's name, image, or likeness, often referred to as one's "persona.,
220
Copyright laws, however, protect "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression." 22  These two rights are separate and
distinct.22 2
With all deference to a superior being, a face is not an original work
of authorship, and courts would likely loath such an ethereal suggestion.
223
An individual's name is clearly not dependent upon a tangible means of
224expression. Moreover, an individual's likeness does not depend on a
tangible medium of expression.225 Why then, should these two seemingly
exclusive legal theories raise a discussion, fostering literally thousands of
pages of-debate?
The industry had determined that the right to an artist's persona would
be wrested away through language or otherwise. This time, however, "or
otherwise" would require a direct attack on the on right of publicity.
A. Wendt v. Host International, Inc.
Paramount Pictures told America, "You wanna go where everybody
knows your name" and for eleven years, the successful television program
216. Stephano v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 586 (N.Y. 1984).
217. Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1994).
218. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8.15[B] (1999)
[hereinafter 2 MCCARTHY].
219. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 218, at 130.
220. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
221. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
222. Wendt v. Host Int'l, 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997).
223. See, e.g., KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, at 715 (Ct. App. 2000).
224. Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 50 F.3d 18, 1995 WL 115571, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1995).
225. Id.
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"Cheers" was just that place.226  Set in a bar in Boston, the characters
became family to their viewing public, largely because the talented
ensemble of actors brought the scripts to life.227 Two characters in
particular, Norm, the overweight and usually unemployed accountant, and
Cliff, the know-it-all mailman, became fixtures on American television.
228
In 1994, Host International decided to "tap into this keg of
goodwill., 229 Host opened a line of Cheers airport bars, after securing a
license from Paramount, the copyright holder of the television program.
230
To create a Cheers-like atmosphere, Host populated the bars with
animatronic figures resembling Norm and Cliff-one of the figures is
overweight; the other is dressed as a mailman.23' When the actors, George
Wendt and John Ratzenberger, sued Host alleging an infringement of their
rights of publicity, Paramount intervened, claiming its copyright preempted
any state law claims. The District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Host and Paramount, and the plaintiffs appealed.233
In an unpublished opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, the court made its position unequivocal.234 Citing Midler, the
Court stated, "at the outset, we wish to make it clear that this is not a
preemption case. Plaintiffs causes of action are not preempted by federal
copyright law.' '2 35  Following the Waits decision, the court further
concluded that as long as the plaintiffs action contains elements other than
those protected by copyright, there is no federal copyright preemption.
236
On remand, the district court compared photos of the animatronic
figures with the actors in person. 7 The court determined the robots were
not likenesses of Wendt or Ratzenburger.238 In fact, the court claimed it
could not find any similarity at all.239
226. Gary Portnory & Judy Hart Angelo, Theme from Cheers (Where Everybody Knows
Your Name) (Earthtone Recording, Inc.).







233. Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1285.
234. Wendt, 1995 WL 11571, at *1.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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In its second reversal of the district court in 1997, the Court of
Appeals once again held that the causes of action were not preempted by
federal copyright law.240 The appellate court held that the district court's
comparison of the photographs of Wendt and Ratzenberger with the
photographs of the animatronic figures was not sufficient to resolve their
claims. 241 Remanded for a third time, the district court yet again decided
for the defendant, Host and Paramount, on summary judgment. 42 Once
again, Wendt and Ratzenberger appealed. This time, however, the Ninth
Circuit voted to deny the petition for rehearing.
243
B. The Wendt Dissent Exposed
Although the Ninth Circuit rejected Paramount's preemption
arguments, a vigorous dissent was filed by Justice Kozinski. The Wendt
dissent suggests this case "pits actor against copyright holder" and that the
parties were fighting over the same intellectual property rights-the right to
make dramatic representations of the characters. 244 The dissent, authored
by Justice Kozinski, cites section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, stating
federal law preempts any state law providing legal or equitable rights
equivalent to exclusive rights within the general scope of federal
copyright.245 Moreover, the dissent states, "the presentation of the robots in
the Cheers bar is a derivative work,246 just like a TV clip, promotion,
photograph, poster, sequel or dramatic rendering of an episode. 247
The dissent's theory is flawed because its application eclipses not
only the right of publicity, but a good portion of trademark law as well.
For instance, based upon the dissent, a Wendt robot, eleven inches tall and
manufactured by Mattel®, is a derivative work. Additionally, a film clip
featuring Wendt and Ratzenberger adverting for Miller Lite, would not
240. Id.
241. See id. The court further instructed that its previous decision required that any
comparison must be determined by a comparison of the actual three dimensional entities and that
any comparison must be decided without reference to the context in which the image appears. Id.
In doing so, the court determined that the question of "likelihood of confusion" was an issue for a
jury to decide. Id.
242. Id. at 809.
243. Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1284.
244. See id. at 1286.
245. Id.
246. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "derivative work" as work based upon one or more
preexisting works or some modification of an original work of authorship).
247. Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286.
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infringe on the right of publicity of the actors. Finally, a poster would be
beyond the purview of the right of publicity.
2 48
The dissent also attacked the majority opinion in White, alleging the
decision was a "sweeping standard., 249  In support, the dissent cites the
Ninth Circuit case Lugosi v. Universal Pictures250 from 1979, and Stephano
v. News Group Publications, Inc.,251 a New York case from 1984. Justice
Kozinski incorrectly relies on these cases for two major reasons.
First, Lugosi addressed whether the decedent, actor Bela Lugosi, had
a right of publicity even though many people prior to Lugosi portrayed the
character Dracula.252 The fact that there was not an inextricable connection
between Lugosi's persona and the character was a crucial factor in the
court's holding. 253 Additionally, California first codified the concept of a
right of publicity in 1982 and a decedent's right of publicity was not
enacted in California until 1985.254 Thus, the vast majority of the 1979
Lugosi decision has been superseded by statute, rendering its persuasive
value, and hence Kozinski's conclusion, dubious.
Second, Stephano is a sixteen year-old case from New York, the
jurisdiction widely considered the most hostile to the right of publicity.
Furthermore, Stephano's facts are not even remotely analogous to Wendt.
255
Stephano addressed whether the use of a photo was for advertising
256purposes or reporting. The court addressed the definition of "trade" and
"advertising purposes" under New York Law. 257 Citing a litany of New
York decisions, the court held a "picture illustrating an article on a matter
248. The logical extension of this argument is that the copyright owner of a photograph,
which features a Budweiser billboard advertisement, would be allowed to utilize that photograph
on any type of merchandise or product. Coffee mugs, linens, T-shirts and posters would be
derivative works, which would escape the purview of the brewer's trademark rights.
249. Id.
250. 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (refusing to recognize a right of publicity for decedents).
251. 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984).
252. Lugosi, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
253. Id. at 343.
254. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1982), amended by CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Supp
2000).
255. See Stephano, 474 N.E.2d 580. Plaintiff, a professional model, brought an action
claiming that defendant used a photograph for advertising without his consent and in violation of
N.Y. Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51. Id. at 582. Plaintiff posed in a bomber jacket for the
photograph and had agreed to the first printing. Id. The photo was then printed a second time in
a regular column in the same publication which contains new and unusual products available in
the metropolitan area. Id. Plaintiff contends that the second printing was an advertisement
because the column mentioned the approximate price and a variety of locations where the jacket
could be purchased. Id. at 581.
256. See id. at 580.
257. Id. at 584.
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of public interest is not considered used for the purposes of trade or
advertising within the prohibition of the statute. '258 Arguably, even
Wendt's counsel would concur with this basic tenet of right of publicity
law. The case remains irrelevant to the question in Wendt.
Justice Kozinski next asks:
Can Warner Brothers [sic] exploit Rhett Butler without
reminding people of Clark Gable? Can Paramount cast Shelly
Long in The Brady Bunch Movie without creating a triable issue
of fact as to whether it is treading on Florence Henderson's right
of publicity? How about Dracula and Bela Lugosi? Ripley and
Sigourney Weaver? Kramer and Michael Richards?
25 9
In a rather strange and unusual footnote, Kozinski then suggests:
To avoid going to trial in such a situation, producers will have to
cast new actors who look and sound very different from the old
ones. A Seinfeld spin-off thus ends up in a bizarro world where
a skinny Newman sits down to coffee with a svelte George, a
stocky Krammer, a fat Jerry and a lanky blonde Elaine. Not
only is goodwill associated with the old show lost, the artistic
freedom of the screenwriters and producers is severely
cramped.260
Kozinski's attempts to blend right of publicity and copyright are quickly
resolved by a cursory reading of California Civil Code Section 3344
subsections (a) and (e). The question of Shelly Long's portrayal of Mrs.
Brady would not fall within the definition of products, merchandise, or
goods for the purpose of "advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of,
products, merchandise, goods or services., 26 1 As to the questions regarding
Clark Gable and Bela Lugosi, the consequence of Kozinski's scenarios
would simply depend upon whether the "exploitation" fell under the rights
that are "equivalent" to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright law.262 If the exploitation was on or in a product or for the
purpose of advertising goods and services, 63 it is axiomatic that such
exploitation would rest beyond preemption.
258. Id. at 585.
259. Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 1287 n.6.
261. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a); see also Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (questioning whether
Florence Henderson's right of publicity would be violated by casting Shelly Long to portray Mrs.
Brady in the Brady Bunch movie).
262. See U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994); see also Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286.
263. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.
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Continuing, Kozinski exhorts, "[u]nder the unbounded right of
publicity announced in White, copyright holders will seldom be able to
avoid trial when sued for infringement of the right of publicity.
264
However, Fleet v. CBS, Inc.,265 rebuts such a position.
In Fleet, a group of actors alleged their rights under California Civil
Code section 3344 were infringed when defendant, CBS, Inc., sought to
distribute a film in which the actors appeared in a video format.266 The
court stated that federal copyright law preempted the right of publicity
claims advanced by the actors because the right was not copyrightable.267
Moreover, the court recognized the actors could have protected their rights
during the negotiation of their contracts.268 The Court indicated that Clint
Eastwood's likeness in a photograph, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's former
name, Bette Midler's original vocal style, and Vanna White's distinct
visual image added an element that made the right of publicity distinct
from copyright. 269  Fleet clearly contradicts Kozinski's position, as it
proposes that performers in a copyrighted film may not use their statutory
right of publicity to prevent the exclusive copyright holder from
distributing the film.
270
Finally, Kozinski argued that the holding in Wendt directly conflicts
with the Baltimore Orioles, Inc., v. Major League Baseball Players
Association. 27  However, the facts of Baltimore Orioles are inapposite to
an analysis of Wendt. In Baltimore Orioles, the players attempted to
control the defendant's broadcast of a baseball game by asserting a right of
publicity claim.272
Similar to Fleet, Baltimore Orioles held that where the plaintiff
attempts to control the defendant's distribution and exhibition of the
copyrighted work, federal copyright preempts.273 The plaintiffs in Fleet
and Baltimore Orioles both tried to control the exhibition of a copyrighted
work in which they agreed to appear.274
264. Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1287.
265. Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Ct. App. 1996).
266. Id. at 647.
267. Id. at 650.
268. Id. at 651.
269. Id. (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983)); Abdul-
Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc.,
971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988)).
270. KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 720-21 (Ct. App. 2000).
271. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
272. Id. at 665.
273. Id. at 679.
274. Id. at 668-69; Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647.
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Wendt and Ratzenberger did not attempt to prevent the defendant
from broadcasting Cheers.275 Certainly under California Civil Code section
3344,276 if Host had elected to exhibit an episode of the program in its bars
across the nation, the plaintiffs' right of publicity claims would have been
preempted by Paramount's copyright.277  However, Wendt and
Ratzenberger never asserted a right of publicity claim in an effort to
prevent the exhibition of the program in syndication, on airplanes, or even
on video-cassette. All such rights of exhibition are undisputedly the sole
property of the copyright holder.278
While Wendt wound its way through the federal courts, the question
of copyright preemption was thoroughly addressed by the California state
279courts. In KNB Enterprises v. Matthews, the plaintiff copyrighted erotic
photographs displayed on a web site for promotional purposes.280 The
models in the photos had expressly transferred their rights of publicity to
the plaintiff copyright holder.281 The defendant copied and displayed the
plaintiff's photographs on his web site for profit, and without the plaintiff s
authorization.282
In KNB Enterprises, the court held federal copyright law does not
preempt a plaintiffs right of publicity claim because a "human likeness is
not copyrightable even if captured in a copyrighted photograph. 283  To
reach this conclusion, the court relied on § 301, noting that two conditions
must be met for preemption to occur. First, plaintiff must demonstrate that
the "subject of the claim must be a work fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter or scope of copyright
protection as described in sections 102 and 103 of 17 United States
Code. 2 84 Second, the plaintiff must assert a right that is "equivalent to the
exclusive rights contained in section 106. ' '285
The court in KNB Enterprises found further guidance from an action
by actor Dustin Hoffman against Capital Cities/ABC.286 Hoffman sued
under California Civil Code section 3344 after Los Angeles Magazine
275. Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811.
276. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
277. Wendt, 125 F.3d 806.
278. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
279. KNB Enters., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713.
280. Id. at 716.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 715.
284. Id. at 718.
285. KNVB Enters., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718.
286. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
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digitally altered a photograph of the actor from the movie Tootsie without
his permission.287 The altered photo featured Hoffman's face and the
American flag background from the original photo.288 Instead of the long
red dress featured in the original, a male model's body in a butter-colored
silk gown designed by Richard Tyler and high-heel shoes designed by
Ralph Lauren were inserted.28 9
In response to Capital Cities' preemption argument, the court
recognized that Hoffman's name, face, and persona were not writings or
works of authorship that come within the subject matter of copyright.290
Thus, his claim failed the first prong of the test under section 301 of the
291Copyright Act. Moreover, the district court agreed with Hoffman that
his right to protect the use of his own name and likeness was separate from
the copyrighted interest of Columbia, the copyright holder in the film.
2 92
This position is not entirely new. Copyright scholar Melville B.
Nimmer has said a persona is not a "writing" of an "author" within the
meaning of the copyright clause.293 Moreover, Nimmer directs that a name
and likeness do not become a work of authorship simply because they are
embodied in a copyrightable work such as a photograph.294 Furthermore,
the rulings in Midler, White, and Waits supported the proposition that the
right of publicity is not preempted by copyright.295
The overwhelming support for the proposition that copyright does not
preempt the right of publicity is undeniable. Yet, the entertainment
industry made a valiant attempt to find a court that would rule otherwise.
Such tenacity raises serious concerns for celebrities regarding the current
status of their rights. Celebrities must now look ahead and anticipate the
next strategy the entertainment industry will employ to wrest all control
and future profit from the performer.
V. READY FOR ANOTHER TAKE
The entertainment industry will continue to develop methods of
controlling the intellectual property rights associated with their projects.
287. Id. at 869-70.
288. Id. at 870.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 871.
291. Id.
292. Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 875.
293. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 109, § 1.01 [B][1][c].
294. Id.
295. Midler, 849 F.2d 460; White, 971 F.2d 1395; Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093
(9th Cir. 1992).
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Such efforts will likely target new technologies that offer heretofore
undreamed of forms of exhibition. With that in mind, the artist should not
be surprised at the entertainment industry's attempts to pass legislation that
limit the rights of performers.
A. Technology
As the Internet increasingly becomes the source of entertainment, it
will not be long before all television programs, films, and music will arrive
in our homes via on-line technology. There is little doubt the entertainment
industry has already looked to the language of standard form contracts in
an effort to secure their position in this area.2 96
For example, Bertelsmann Music Group ("BMG") has entered into a
partnership with previous arch rival, Napster, taking us one-step closer to
all music arriving in the form of a file rather than a CD.297 Such a change
in format raises the question of container deductions.2 98 If packaging no
longer exists, it is possible the cost of the computer program development
and required hardware will become a deductible expense under the same
language.
Moreover, when streaming technology 299 advances to the level of
sophistication whereby entire films are downloaded on a personal
computer, there is little doubt such technology will be addressed by the
"future methods" clauses in existence. 300 Arguably, this transmission is not
"television" as defined by the 1960 SAG settlement.30' Therefore, it could
be posited that all pre-1960 films are no longer governed by the
Reagan/Wasserman settlement.
Moreover, when today's artist participates in a film, often the studio is
able to deduct enormous costs of goods related to the production of
videotapes and DVDs. Similar to the container deductions taken by the
record companies, the language in today's contracts already contemplates
296. Neil Spencer, Review: The Year in the Arts: Pop 2000: Go On, Take the Money and
Hum; Vacuous Hits Ruled the Charts, But There Was Fine Music On the Margins, THE
OBSERVER, Dec. 24, 2000, at 9.
297. Id.
298. The packaging of product in considered a customary deduction prior to the calculation
of royalties to be paid the artist. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED To KNOW ABOUT THE
Music BUSINESS 173 (1997).
299. Sara Steetle, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.: Signaling the Need for a
Deeper Analysis of Copyright Infringement of Digital Recordings, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 31,
35-36 (2000) (defining "streaming technology").
300. Frederick M. Muir, Movie Artists May Cash in on Videotapes, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28,
1988, at 1.
301. See supra Part II.A.1.
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such deductions if interpreted broadly. As such, the vast cost of
technological development could be passed on to the artist through the use
of creative accounting and, once again, the visionaries' language.
B. Legislation
Celebrities and their representatives must also remain ever vigilant
with respect to new legislation. Recent actions to amend the Copyright Act
would have proved disastrous for composers and their heirs.30 2 Shockingly,
such legislation almost became law.
Recently, language was inserted into the Satellite Home Viewer
Improvement Act of 1999 which would have rendered all recorded music
work-for-hire.30 3 In other words, all music recorded for a record label
would become the property of the label rather than the creator. This blatant
attempt to steal the intellectual property rights from the artist was authored
by a Congressional aide named Mitch Glazier and was supported by the
RIAA.
304
The results of such legislation would have been devastating to the
artist. However, it is conceivable that a similar attempt to legislate away
the rights of creative individuals will someday find success.
VI. CONCLUSION
For over seventy years, the entertainment industry has made every
effort to retain all intellectual property rights associated with their products.
Sadly, these efforts are usually at the expense of the artists who created the
product itself. Based on this pattern of activity, artists must continue to
rebel every time they find themselves lured toward a place where
everybody else owns their name.
302. 17 U.S.C. § 119 (1994 & Supp. 1V 1999).
303. Id.
304. See News, available at http://www.riaa.com/PR (Feb. 10, 2000). Mr. Glazier has joined
RJAA as Senior Vice President of Government Relations and Legislative Counsel. Id.
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